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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has jurisdiction 
over this Petition for Review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
S 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1953, as amended), 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Industrial Commission of Utah (hereinafter 
"Commission") erroneously interpret or apply the law? If it has, 
it constitutes grounds under Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
to grant relief sought and this court shall accord no deference to 
the Commission's determination. Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991) The appellant, 
(hereinafter "Sheikh") expressly noted in opening arguments and 
closing arguments the appropriate standards and guidelines under 
the law concerning intent to discriminate and constructive 
discharge. 
2. Even if the Commission correctly interpreted and applied 
the law, was the Commission's action based upon a determination 
that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-
16(4)(g), this court shall grant relief if the Commissions action 
was based upon a determination of fact not supported by substantial 
evidence in light of the whole record and if it substantially 
prejudiced Sheikh. To challenge those finding Sheikh must marshall 
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence. Nelson v. Department of Employment Security, 
801 P.2d 158 (Utah App. 1990) Substantial evidence is more than a 
mere "scintilla" of evidence though it something less than the 
weight of the evidence. It is such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P 2d. 63 (Utah App. 
1989). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639 F.2d. 1199 (D Utah 
1986), Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d. 1536 (11th Cir. 
1987), Nulf v. International Paper Co., 656 F.2d. 553 (10th Cir. 
1981), McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 Sup. Ct. 1817 (U.S. 
1973). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The law regarding discrimination requires that the 
employer articulate legitimate reasons for the disparate treatment 
(once the person has been identified of falling within a protected 
class, i.e. pregnancy); then the employee has the obligation of 
demonstrating that the articulated reasons are a sham and are not 
valid. The Commission and the Administrative Law Judge failed to 
correctly apply this last step of the requirement for establishing 
discrimination in that they made no findings regarding the 
substantial amount of evidence demonstrating that the articulated 
reason for the aberrant schedule given to Sheikh upon her return 
from maternity leave, ie, training of a new hire named Russell, was 
a sham. The evidence clearly establishes that the training of 
Russell did not account for the intolerable nature of the schedule, 
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thus, Sheikh met her burden of demonstrating that the articulated 
reason was a sham and under the law, judgment should have been 
awarded to Sheikh• 
In regard to constructive discharge, the Commission and the 
Administrative Law Judge failed to give weight to the fact that no 
effort had been made by the employer to give assurances of a change 
in the schedule or to alleviate the onerous nature of the schedule. 
Thus they failed to apply the law correctly. 
POINT II: The Administrative Law Judge and the Commission made 
determinations of fact and conclusions that were not based on 
substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. 
In regard to discrimination, substantial and significant 
evidence was provided by Sheikh demonstrating that the articulated 
reason for the aberrant schedule, the training of the new hire 
Russell, was a sham. In fact there was no evidence much less 
substantial evidence offered at all by the State to explain why 
prior to Sheikh' s return from maternity leave and subsequent to her 
termination there had never been anyone placed on a "Sheikh" type 
of schedule despite the fact that Russell was in training both two 
or more weeks prior to Sheikh's return and two weeks after Sheikh's 
termination. In regard to constructive discharge, there was no 
evidence whatsoever much less substantial evidence to support the 
conclusion that the schedule was not "intolerable" and there was 
virtually no evidence to demonstrate that Sheikh would have rotated 
into a more tolerable schedule after three weeks. To the contrary, 
the substantial evidence in this regard was that the schedule had 
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never operated on the rotational basis as planned and that Sheikh 
had no reasonable expectation that it would be and that no 
assurances were given to her or efforts to ameliorate the situation 
once the State knew of the problem despite the fact that Sheikh 
stayed for another two weeks after giving her notice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In addressing the issues raised by this Appeal, 
Petitioner/Appellant, Sandra Sheikh, will be referred to as 
"Sheikh" and Respondent/Appellee, State of Utah/Utah Department of 
Public Safety will be referred to as "State" or "Department of 
Public Safety" 
Sheikh filed a claim with the Industrial Commission of Utah 
based on a claim of sex discrimination because of 
pregnancy/maternity and pregnancy related matters and constructive 
discharge. The matter was heard before the Honorable Benjamin A. 
Sims, Administrative Law Judge, and the Administrative Law Judge 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (hereinafter 
"ALJ Order") on September 9, 1993. A true and correct copy of the 
ALJ Order is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A. Sheikh then 
filed a motion for review before the Industrial Commission. On 
August 25, 1994, the Industrial Commission of Utah, (hereinafter 
the "Commission") issued an Order Denying Motion for Review 
(hereinafter "Review Order"). A true and correct copy of the 
Review Order is attached hereto as Exhibit B. The ALJ Order denied 
and dismissed Sheikh's claim with prejudice. The Review Order 
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adopted the Findings of Fact set forth in the ALJ Order and again 
denied Sheikh's motion and affirmed the Administrative Law Judge 
decision. 
There was no question in the ALJ Order or the Review Motion as 
to the fact that Sheikh fell within a protected class of persons 
under Utah Law and that upon her return from maternity leave, (she 
worked as a dispatcher in the Price Department of Public Safety) 
she was given a very difficult, rigorous and unusual schedule of 
shifts. The questions as more fully set forth in the Statement of 
Issues and Argument is whether or not the State gave a legitimate 
reason for the disparate treatment of Sheikh upon her return from 
maternity leave and whether or not Sheikh, by voluntarily resigning 
her position, was constructively discharged. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS MATERIAL TO ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL1 
1. The Petitioner/Appellant, hereinafter "Sheikh", was 
employed by the Carbon County Sheriff's Office in April, 1980. 
(Tran. p. 113) In August, 1988, the Sheriff's Department 
consolidated with the Utah Highway Patrol Office which was then 
called the Department of Public Safety. (Tran. p. 113) Sheikh was 
employed as a dispatcher in the combined time that she was at the 
Carbon County Sheriff's Office and after the consolidation with the 
Department of Public Safety. (Tran. p. 133) She left the 
employment of the Department of Public Safety on May 24, 1990. 
(Tran. p. 113) 
1 
The citation to the transcript from the hearing on August 27, 1993 are set forth after each fact 
Statement below. Citations to the transcript will not be recited again in the Argument when the facts are 
stated. 
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2. At the time Sheikh left the employment of the Department 
of Public Safety (hereinafter "State") she was earning $638.40 by-
weekly and was receiving State paid employment benefits in the 
amount of $186.36 by-weekly (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, September 9, 1993, hereinafter "ALJ Order", Finding No. 
1). 
3. When the consolidation took place in approximately 1988, 
Nancy Allred (aka Nancy Hansen) became the manager of the dispatch 
center. (Tran. p. 7) 
4. Lisa Shook was the direct superior of Sheikh and held the 
position of shift supervisor. (Tran. p. 8) When Lisa Shook became 
the shift supervisor, Nancy Allred gave Shook the assignment of 
doing the scheduling (Tran. p. 8), however, scheduling was within 
the scope of duties of Allred and Allred had the final authority 
and decisions on schedules, (Tran. pp. 9, 240), and Shook discussed 
scheduling almost daily with Allred. (Tran. p. 238) 
5. Preparation of the schedules was difficult and the Price 
dispatch center had little or no personnel resource slack. ALJ 
Order, Finding No. 9; (Tran. p. 49, 235,238 239) 
6. Sheikh learned she was pregnant in Fall of 1989 and 
informed Lisa Shook. (Tran. p. 115) On January 7, 1990, Sheikh 
gave notice to Allred that she expected to take maternity leave 
commencing on February 14, 1990. (Tran. p. 114) Subsequently, 
Sheikh learned that her due date had changed and she gave a new 
written notice to Allred on about February 27, 1990 stating that 
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her maternity day had changed to approximately March 8, 1990. 
(Tran. p. 114) 
7. Nancy Allred was upset that Sheikh had told Shook of her 
pregnancy before telling Allred (Tran, p. 116, 294) and also was 
upset when Sheikh changed her due date and Allred expressed that 
this would necessitate rescheduling again. (Tran. p. 117, 294) 
While Sheikh was on maternity leave, a dispatcher named Patty quit 
on approximately March 16, 1990. (Tran. p. 218) 
8. Shook was a loyal employee and obeyed orders from Allred. 
(Tran. p. 12) 
9. Prior to February 22, 1990, the schedule had rotated to 
some degree erratically and approximately every two weeks. (Tran. 
pp. 26, 30-32)) 
10. John Kelly, a fellow employee, prepared a suggested new 
schedule which would theoretically provide that each dispatcher 
would work a certain shift for three weeks and then rotate to a new 
shift. (Tran. p. 24) 
11. It was desirable to have three days off in between a 
major shift change to allow the person to adjust to a new schedule. 
(Tran. pp. 20-21) 
12. Short-changes or double-backs refer to working a shift 
and then returning to another shift within less than 8 or 9 hours. 
These short-changes or double-backs are undesirable and were not 
deliberately scheduled; rather, they were necessitated on certain 
occasions due to people calling in sick or taking vacation, ie. 
unplanned events. (Tran. pp. 21, 28, 29, 63) 
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13. The schedule prepared on or around February 22, 1990 was 
discussed with Sheikh prior to her leaving on maternity leave and 
she was informed that pursuant to the schedule she would be working 
a swing-shift (ie., 3 pm to 11 pm) for three weeks following her 
return from maternity leave. (Tran. pp. 121- 154, 75) 
14. A new dispatcher named Russell was hired and went into 
training as a dispatcher. It is normal for dispatchers to train 
for 6 to 8 weeks. (Tran. pp. 12, 199) Russell was in training for 
approximately 3 weeks prior to Sheikh's return on May 4, 1990 and 
for approximately 1 to 2 weeks after Sheikh's termination on May 
24, 1990. (Tran. pp. 34, 65, 213) 
15. A new trainee must have an experienced dispatcher with 
the trainee at all times until the trainee has been sufficiently 
trained and is not allowed to work a shift alone. (Tran. pp. 225, 
247, 288) 
16. Shortly before Sheikh returned from her maternity leave, 
Shook called Sheikh at home and explained that adjustments had been 
made to Sheikh's schedule and that she would not be returning to 
straight afternoon shifts for three weeks. (Tran pp. 245-248) 
17. Shook said something to the effect when she called Sheikh 
that she had "bad" news and that Sheikh wasn't going to like the 
schedule, (Tran. p. 125) Shook recognized that she would not want 
to work it. (Tran. pp. 261, 268) 
18. Allred acknowledged in her testimony that scheduling a 
dispatcher with small children at home was more difficult because 
it was not as easy for them to find babysitters and such on short 
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notice or in the middle of the night. (Tran. p. 10) Allred 
expressed on various occasions the difficulty of scheduling 
dispatchers with small children. (Tran. p. 118) 
19. Maternity leave where a person is generally gone for 1 to 
2 months, made scheduling difficult during that person's absence. 
(Tran. p. 10) 
20. Prior to Sheikh's maternity leave, it had only been 
necessary for Allred to schedule one other maternity leave which 
was Shook's and Shook was on a fixed schedule, that is she always 
worked afternoon shifts, and did not rotate as did the other 
dispatchers. (ALJ Order Finding No. 7; Tran. pp. 143-144) 
21. Sheikh returned to work following her maternity leave on 
Friday May 4, 1990. The schedule that was set for her upon return 
for the next three weeks was as follows: Friday, May 4, 1990 - 8:00 
am to 1:00 pm (CPR Training), and 11:00 pm to 7:00 am; Saturday, 
May 5, 1990 11:00 pm to 7:00 am; Sunday, May 6, 1990, 11:00 pm to 
7:00 am; Monday, May 7, 1990 - 4:00 pm to 12:00 midnight; 
Tuesday, May 8, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 9, 1990 - off; 
Thursday, May 10, 1990 - noon to 8:00 pm; Friday, May 11, 1990 -
3:00 pm to 11:30 pm; Saturday, May 12, 1990 - 11:00 pm to 7:00 am; 
Sunday May 13, 1990 - 11:00 pm to 7:00 am; Monday, May 14, 1990 -
4:00 pm to midnight; Tuesday, May 15, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 
16, 1990 - off; Thursday, May 17, 1990 - 8:00 am to 4:00 pm; 
Friday, May 18, 1990 9:00 am to 5:00 pm; Saturday, May 19, 1990 
11:00 pm to 7:00 am; Sunday, May 20, 1990- 11:00 pm to 7:00 am; 
Monday, May 21, 1990 - 4:00 pm to 1:00 am; Tuesday, May 22, 1990 -
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off; Wednesday, May 23, 1990 - off; Thursday, May 24, 1990 -
8:00 am to 4:00 pm. (ALJ Order, Finding No. 12; Tran. pp. 127-
129) The schedule included a short-change each week and a change 
of between three different shifts during each of the three weeks. 
22. Prior to Sheikh's return, during the approximate 3 weeks 
while Russell was training, no one was given the schedule which 
Sheikh was given upon her return, herein after the "Sheikh 
Schedule" (Tran. pp. 33-34) Following Sheikh's termination or at 
least the 4 days following while Russell was still training, no one 
was given the Sheikh Schedule. (Tran. p. 212) No one had in the 
two years since consolidation been given a schedule or worked a 
schedule like the Sheikh schedule and no one after was given such 
a schedule. (Tran. pp. 90, 175-178, 130-131, 132) 
23. The Sheikh schedule was a "pre-planned" schedule, rather, 
it was not a last minute change on occasion to accommodate on 
unplanned event such as a sick call in. (Tran. p. 212) 
24. The schedules in all the time that Allred had been with 
the State, following the consolidation, had never worked as 
planned, ie., there were last minute changes that had to be made to 
accommodate an unexpected or unplanned event such as a sick call, 
and "rotation" was not a " given", ie., it did not always occur. 
(Tran. pp. 26, 27, 29, 69, 74) 
25. Sheikh could not determine what her schedule would have 
been had she remained with the Department after May 24, 1990 and 
had been given no reason to think there would be in fact she 
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believed there would be no relief because Allred would not change 
the Sheikh schedule. (Tran. p. 129, 140, 155, 156) 
26. Allred acknowledged that Sheikh could not have known what 
shift she would be working after May 24, 1990. (Tran. p. 234) 
27. Allred could not state what Sheikh's schedule would have 
been had Sheikh remained with the Department after May 24, 1990 
(Tran. pp. 129, 140, 155, 156) 
28. Upon Sheikh's resignation, the stated reason on the 
resignation form was the rotational schedule. Neither Allred or 
Shook gave any assurances that the schedule would change and become 
more tolerable if Sheikh could wait until the end of the 3 weeks 
period. (Tran. p. 90) Allred made no effort to try and convince 
Sheikh to stay with the Department despite her 10 1/2 years of 
service and despite that she was considered a good employee. 
(Tran. p. 140, 155, 156) 
29. Shook learned of Sheikh's resignation on about May 10, 
1990. (Tran. p. 252) Shook did not discuss Sheikh's resignation 
or offer to work with her or assist her in obtaining a more 
tolerable schedule, nor did she assure her that she would not be on 
the schedule following May 24, 1990 and when asked "why" she said 
"I don't know". (Tran. p. 254) 
30. A pre-planned rotational schedule does not occur as 
planned when someone needs even 1 day off. It changes the whole 
schedule. (Tran. p. 28) 
31. A.J.'s (temporary personnel) (rather than regular 
dispatchers) were used to fill in during Russell's training while 
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Sheikh was still on maternity leave and A.J. 's were used to fill in 
following Sheikh's departure on May 24, 1990 while Russell was 
still training even though a new person named Maria had been hired 
to take Sheikh's place. (Tran. pp. 33, 34, 207) 
32. The availability or unavailability of A.J.'s or money to 
pay A.J.'s was not a factor taken into consideration in the 
preparation of the Sheikh schedule. (Tran. p. 231, 252, 266) 
33. No attempt was made to schedule A.J.'s to alleviate the 
Sheikh schedule and Allred and Shook didn't know or check to see if 
these was money available for A.J.'s (Tran. p. 207, 231) 
34. Sheikh's employment history and performance were 
satisfactory, on a written evaluation, in the various categories, 
Sheikh received either 4 or 5 out of a possible 1-5 markings, she 
received no written reprimands from the time Allred became the 
supervisor, shortly after the consolidation, and prior to Sheikh's 
departure on May 24, 1990 and Allred did not give any oral 
criticism during that time. (Tran. pp. 36-38) 
35. It is difficult to find people that will be dispatchers 
in the Price area because there are not as many people looking for 
the job and not as many qualified applicants; being the supervisor 
and manager of the center is not an easy job, it is very stressful. 
(Tran. p. 40) 
36. It was stressful and difficult to prepare schedules and 
to deal with the continual changes that had to be made to the 
schedules due to unplanned events. (Tran. 121, 136-137, 292) 
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37. Shook and Allred discussed scheduling problems often. 
(Tran. P. 238) 
38. Sheikh had worked rotational shifts in the past and had 
worked short-changes. Sheikh had never refused to work a 
particular rotational shift or a short-change. (Tran. pp. 121, 
136-137, 292) 
39. It was difficult to adjust from one type of shift to 
another such as from day shift to a graveyard and a two week 
rotational was found not to be adequate in giving people time to 
adjust to the new schedule. That is why a 3 week rotational was 
put into place. (Tran. p. 56) 
40. From December 23, 1989 through May 1990 the double-backs 
worked by dispatchers were Marty-4, Lisa-2, Patty-1, Leah-4, John-
1, Diane-2, Russell-1 and Sandra-0. (Tran. p. 68) 
41. Russell was put on the day and or afternoon shifts for 
her training. (Tran. p. 72) 
42. Schedules were not deliberately set to include double-
backs or moving major changes to other shifts. (Tran. p. 77) 
43. Sheikh, after being told what the schedule would be upon 
her return, that is afternoon shifts for 3 weeks, Sheikh did not 
criticize the schedule and did not make a request for a change. 
(Tran. p. 121) 
44. Typically if double-backs or erratic changes in shifts 
were included within the schedule it was not a "pre-planned" 
schedule, rather it was a result of unforseen and unplanned events. 
(Tran. p. 102) 
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45. The persons who had worked double-backs as set forth in 
fact No. 37 above over an approximate 5 month period had not been 
pre-scheduled for those double-backs. (Tran. p. 104) 
46. Sheikh did not have a pattern of calling in sick on 
graveyard shifts prior to her return from maternity leave. (Tran. 
p. 110) 
47. Allred indicated that she was upset with Sheikh when she 
found out Sheikh was pregnant and that Sheikh had told Shook about 
it first and not told Allred first. (Tran. p. 116) 
48. Until Sheikh's return from maternity leave, she had never 
in all of the years working as a dispatcher, approximately 10, been 
given a schedule that contained three different shift and a double-
back each week for a period of three weeks. (Tran. p. 123) 
49. Sheikh was not aware of anyone in the department in the 
2 years following consolidation that had been pre-scheduled ahead 
to work as many changes as were set out in the Sheikh schedule. 
(Tran. pp. 130-132) 
50. Sheikh found the Sheikh schedule intolerable, it affected 
her physically and mentally, she was under a tremendous amount of 
stress, she could not establish an eating or sleeping pattern, she 
was unable to spend time with her family, and she was concerned for 
the safety of the Officers because of the stress and fatigue. 
(Tran. pp. 130 132, 136, 290, 291) 
51. Sheikh believed that no one, not even a person who was 
physically well, could work such a schedule and do a good job. 
(Tran. p. 131) 
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52. Sheikh felt that she was forced to resign because no one 
gave her any assurances that the schedule would not continue or 
that some other bad schedule would not be given to her and no one 
made any changes to alleviate it through the use of A.J.'s or 
otherwise. (Tran. p. 131) 
53. Sheikh gave notice on May 10, 1990 and did not quit until 
May 24, 1990, ie. two weeks notice, because she felt she owed it to 
the State since she had worked for them for so long. (Tran. p. 
133) 
54. Sheikh was not adverse to a "rotating schedule", she had 
worked rotating schedules in the past, rather, the rotation to 
which she objected in her termination notice was rotating from 
shift to shift within 1 week including double-backs. (Tran. pp. 
136, 292) Sheikh had never refused to work any particular shift. 
(Tran. p. 121) 
55. Sheikh was concerned about her health and mental state 
and stress and, although her mother would be available for 
babysitting during erratic shifts, she felt it was undesirable to 
impose upon her mother. (Tran. p. 174) 
56. Everyone including Sheikh complained frequently about the 
schedules. (Tran. p. 286) Due to complaints, John Kelly proposed 
the new 3 week rotation to alleviate some problems. (Tran. p. 286) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED OR APPLIED 
THE LAW CONCERNING DISCRIMINATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
DISCHARGE 
-16-
A. DISCRIMINATION 
The Commission erroneously interpreted or applied the law 
regarding discrimination because of pregnancy. 
Utah Code Annotated § 34-35-6 states: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a)(i)for an employer to. . .discriminated in 
matter of. . .conditions of employment against any 
person otherwise qualified, because of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions . . . 
The ALJ Order correctly states the basic legal standard for 
establishing discrimination, that the employee has the "initial 
burden to establish a prima facia showing of the employerfs 
discrimination. Thereafter the burden of production shifts to the 
employer to articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason 
for the conduct in question. If the employer succeeds, the burden 
of production shifts back to the employee to show that the reasons 
articulated by the employer were mere pretext for the 
discrimination." (ALJ Order p.6). 
Case law on this issue demonstrates that an employee must 
rebut "articulated legitimate reasons" for the seemingly 
discriminatory action. Utah, in Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc. 
639 F.2d. 1199 (D. Utah 1986) adopted the standard set forth by the 
10th Circuit in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 
1817 (U.S. 1973). As stated in McDonnell Douglas " . . . direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent is unlikely to arise in the 
Plaintiff's case." Discrimination as a motivation for one's 
actions is seldom admitted and is often cloaked "in thin robes of 
what the law deems legitimate." . . . For that reason, evidence of 
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discrimination in most contexts will be indirect or circumstantial. 
"The United States Supreme Court recognized early on the problems 
of proof extant in such an inquiry." Id. (Emphasis added). The 
McDonnell Douglas case gave a number of examples of conduct showing 
an intent and motive for discriminatory treatment. One such factor 
is procedural irregularities, although there are numerous other 
types of circumstantial evidence that also cannot be explained 
outside of discriminatory intent. In Sheikh's situation, there are 
numerous examples, including procedural irregularities, that cannot 
be explained outside of discriminatory intent, which are discussed 
in more detail in Point II below. In the Sheikh case, the 
Commission apparently misinterpreted or misapplied the law 
regarding evidence of discrimination. This is evident by the 
statements made in the ALJ Order: "There was no indication in 
testimony at the hearing that the employer ever singled out the 
charging party simply because she was pregnant or had been pregnant 
. . . " (ALJ Order p. 6); "there was no evidence that the 
dissatisfaction resulted from any illegal discrimination against 
any employee prior to the allegations of this current complaint." 
(ALJ Order, Finding # 16, p. 4). These statements indicate that 
the Administrative Law Judge was looking for direct evidence of 
discrimination rather than appropriately applying or interpreting 
the standard in Bowen and McDonnell Douglas, that is, that one must 
look at the circumstantial evidence and see through "robes" of 
legitimacy that are offered by the employer as explanations for its 
conduct. 
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In addition to the actual findings of the Administrative Law 
Judge, the misinterpretation or misapplication of the law is 
evident by the lack of findings and conclusions by the 
Administrative Law Judge. For instance, in the "Legal Discussion11 
of the ALJ Order, it states "The employer articulated legitimate 
reasons for the schedule . . . " (ALJ Order, p. 6) The Discussion 
and Findings did not, however, include the fact that Sheikh 
presented substantial evidence (see discussion in Point II below) 
to rebut those "legitimate articulated reasons". Again in the 
"Conclusions of Law" of the ALJ Order, it states "In any event, 
assuming that the employee did make a prima facia [sic] the 
employer articulated legitimate reasons why the charging party's 
schedule was difficult and therefore it is concluded that the 
Charging Party cannot prevail." (ALJ Order, p. 7, fl 1) There is 
nothing in that conclusion or the testimony that addresses Sheikh's 
rebuttal of those "articulated legitimate reasons". 
Thus, it is apparent that the Judge stopped short of applying 
the entire standard, which is that Sheikh was obligated to rebut 
seemingly legitimate reasons put forth by the State. She did rebut 
those reasons as more fully set forth in Point II below. Nulf v. 
International Paper Company» 656 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1981) states 
that if the actions by an employer are not satisfactorily explained 
then it is more likely than not that such actions were based on 
discriminatory criteria. That is, if the pregnancy, or pregnancy 
related matters are followed by disparate treatment and/or 
termination of employment, there is an inference that there was a 
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discriminatory motive unless there is a very satisfactory 
explanation for the conduct of which is complained. Id. 
As more fully set forth in Point II below, the State attempted 
to legitimize its conduct by explaining that Sheikh had been given 
the schedule she was given simply because there was a rotational 
schedule and a new employee was training, and it necessitated 
moving the person scheduled for the swing shift (for which Sheikh 
was scheduled) into the intolerable schedule. As more fully set 
forth below, the facts show clearly that the State had never, under 
any circumstances including training or other difficulties, 
scheduled someone to work the type of schedule for which Sheikh was 
scheduled, that Russell, the person in training, was in training 
prior to Sheikh's return to work and the State was as short-handed 
then as after Sheikh's return and no one had been asked to work 
that schedule, and that for at least one week following Sheikh's 
termination, Russell was still training and the State was as short-
handed as before and no one was asked to work the same schedule as 
Sheikh during this time period.2 Examples of cases where there 
were legitimate reasons for conduct which appeared to be 
discriminatory are found in Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d. 109 
(D.C. Cir. 1980). In that case there was a falsification of 
credentials and records by the employee, and a pattern of continual 
dishonesty. That was considered a legitimate reason for discharge. 
2 
As set forth and cited In Point II below, the State could not testify at the hearing as to what 
schedule existed beyond one week after Sandra Sheikh's termination date, that Is, the state witnesses could not 
testify that anyone after that was ever asked to work the same schedule despite the fact that Russell was still 
In training. 
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In another case, Connors v. University of Tennessee Press, 558 F. 
Supp. 38 (N.D. Tenn. 1982), a woman had taken a leave of absence 
for pregnancy and then had requested an additional leave of 
absence. The employer had shown dissatisfaction with the woman's 
prior work, the woman had a short tenure at the job, she had a 
record of past absences and the employer had the need to 
permanently fill the position at that time. That was considered a 
legitimate excuse for terminating the woman upon her taking a 
second leave of absence. The Court in Nulf also found that a 
refusal to perform duties and insubordination was a sufficient 
reason for discharge unless it was the discriminatory act of the 
employer that induced the conduct of the employee complained of by 
the employer. None of these factors, as can be seen in the 
transcript and as set forth in Point II below, are found to exist 
in Sheikh's case. There was no unsatisfactory work performance; in 
fact, she was considered a good employee; there were no 
falsehoods, no insubordination, no reprimands and Sheikh had a long 
tenure with the State. Further, there was no need to permanently 
fill the position. Thus, the commission misapplied or 
misinterpreted the law by failing to recognize any of the testimony 
put on by Sheikh which demonstrated that the articulated (and 
seemingly) legitimate reason, (Russell's training) was in fact a 
sham and a cloak for discrimination. 
B. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 
The Administrative Law Judge correctly stated that to show 
constructive discharge "she must show that a reasonable person 
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would view the working conditions as intolerable.11 (ALJ Order p. 
6) The test for constructive discharge in Utah as set forth by the 
10th Circuit is whether a reasonable person would find the 
conditions intolerable. Daemi v. Churchfs Fried Chicken, 931 
F.2d 1379 (10th Cir. 1991) Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395 (10th 
Cir. 1983), Ramsey v. City and County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004 
(10th Cir. 1990). 
In a similar case, Garner v. Wal-Mart, 807 F.2d 1536 (11th 
Cir. 1987), a woman department store manager took maternity leave 
and upon her return she was not reinstated as a department head 
manager, rather she was placed as a floater from department to 
department. The person who had filled her position during her 
absence had been her subordinate before she left. The employer 
gave reasons for its actions such as that it needed to fill the 
position at the time, that the employee who had been placed into 
that position during the woman's absence had been doing a good job, 
that the company had been gearing up for the Christmas season and 
that the new employee was fully geared up and prepared for the 
Christmas season, whereas the woman who had left on maternity leave 
was not. The Court said that these reasons were a pretext and they 
were not legitimate reasons. The Court determined that there were 
other methods by which the employer could have integrated the 
employee back into work and should have at least assured her that 
it would work toward integrating her back into the managerial 
position within a short period of time. The employee, however, 
quit the first day and the Court found she had not given the 
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employer a reasonable chance to remedy the situation and therefore 
denied her claim. In the Sheikh case, the Administrative Law Judge 
found ". . .no one told her that she would not have to work this 
schedule indefinitely " (ALJ Order, p. 5 f 20) The Judge 
apparently ignored this significant piece of evidence and therefore 
it appears misinterpreted or misapplied the law concerning 
constructive discharge. This evidence is significant in view of 
the Garner v. Wal-Mart case because the Court there found that the 
employer could have and should have, at the very least, assured the 
woman that it would work to integrate her back into her position. 
This indicates that there was some obligation on the part of the 
State to at least give assurances to Sheikh that this schedule was 
short-termed, just a temporary situation. The Administrative Law 
Judge apparently ignored the testimony of Sheikh that she did not 
know if that schedule would last forever or if she would be given 
other intolerable schedules forever in an effort to "punish" her 
for making Allred and Shook1s life difficult by not only taking 
maternity leave, but giving notice of one maternity leave date and 
then changing it subsequently. There is further indication that 
the Administrative Law Judge also found that Sheikh did not express 
to Shook that " . . . she could not or would not work the assigned 
schedule . . .", that Allred, (the second level supervisor) " . . 
. was not aware that the charging party was unhappy about the 
schedule until May 10, 1990 . . . " and that Sheikh had it within 
her power to ask others to trade shifts with her, thus having the 
means within her control to modify the schedule herself. (ALJ 
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Order, p. 4 ff 14, 15, p. 6) The Judge failed to correctly apply 
the law by requiring the State to give assurances to Sheikh or use 
other alternatives to remedy the training situation. The Judge 
found that, had Sheikh waited through the three week period, that 
her shift would have automatically rotated and changed to a more 
tolerable one. The Administrative Law Judge also concluded that 
the schedule "... although difficult was not intolerable."3 (ALJ 
Order, p. 7) The Administrative Law Judge obviously stopped short 
of the complete application of the law based on the Garner v. Wal-
Mart cases and other cases cited therein, Implicitly, the issue of 
constructive discharge, includes a consideration of whether the 
employee gave the employer adequate opportunity to remedy the 
situation before quitting and whether the employer gave assurances 
as to the future. The Administrative Law Judge made no findings 
concerning whether Sheikh gave the State an adequate opportunity to 
assure her as to future schedule or to remedy the schedule Sheikh 
found intolerable. Obviously the Administrative Law Judge ignored 
or took as insignificant the evidence that no one had told Sheikh 
that she would not have to work the schedule indefinitely. Also, 
the Administrative Law Judge completely ignored the undisputed 
testimony that Sheikh stayed for two weeks following her 
resignation. Even if Allred and Shook did not know or realize 
before May 10, 1990 that Sheikh was extremely overwrought and 
dissatisfied with the schedule and that she found it intolerable, 
3 
The Administrative Law Judge also found that John Kelly, a fellow dispatch employee said that he 
would have worked the schedule. (ALJ Order, p. 4, 1 13) If this was a basis for the finding that the schedule 
was not intolerable, it was not a legitimate finding for the reasons set forth in Point II. 
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they certainly knew two weeks before she left, the date she 
resigned. During that time period they had adequate opportunity to 
give Sheikh assurances or to actually remedy the schedule. The 
Judge made no findings on this issue which indicates a complete 
misinterpretation or misapplication of the law on constructive 
discharge. 
Finally, the Court misinterpreted or misapplied the law 
because it ignored the fact that the U.A.D.D. found that Sheikh had 
been forced to resign which entitled her to unemployment benefits. 
(Transcript, Opening Statement, p. 7) This was presented to the 
Judge at the hearing, the State objected. The Administrative Law 
Judge did not rule on the objection but did note the objection. 
The Nulf case, a 10th Circuit case, allows the Court to consider 
these other agency rulings in its determination and the Court 
apparently ignored the 10th Circuit law in Nulf by not considering 
the constructive discharge finding. 
POINT II: THE COMMISSION'S ACTION WAS BASED UPON A 
DETERMINATION OF FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE 
The Commission adopted the findings of the Administrative Law 
Judge and denied Sheikh's Motion for Review, concluding that 
Sheikh's schedule was not motivated by a discriminatory purpose, 
but by the employer's staffing needs, and that Sheikh was not 
constructively discharged because she did not take advantage of 
opportunities to modify the schedule and the schedule would have 
been resolved within a few weeks. (Order Denying Motion for Review, 
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hereinafter "Review Order", p. 2) As more fully explained below, 
the Commission based it's action on two determinations, that is no 
discriminatory purpose and no constructive discharge, and these 
determinations are not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record taken as a whole. 
A. DISCRIMINATION 
As discussed in Point I. supra, if the employer articulates 
legitimate reasons for its action, the burden shifts back to the 
employee to show that the reasons are a mere pretext for 
discrimination. See Bowen, supra; McDonnell Douglas, supra; Nulf, 
supra. In Sheikh'scase, the employer did articulate seemingly 
legitimate reasons for the onerous schedule given to Sheikh upon 
her return from maternity leave. The employer claimed that it had 
a new employee who was training and this created special scheduling 
problems. (ALJ Order, Finding No. 12, p. 3-4) The State explained 
that the swing shift is the only shift on which a newly hired, 
unexperienced person can train because double coverage is needed, 
that a three week rotational schedule had been set up in February 
of 1990, that Sheikh had been scheduled for the swing shift upon 
her return from maternity leave, that the normal practice during a 
training period, was to rotate down to the next shift the person 
who would normally be scheduled for the swing shift and that just 
happened to be Sheikh. While this explanation on its face makes 
sense, it does not make any common sense whatsoever when viewed in 
light of the other substantial evidence in the case which, 
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apparently, the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission failed 
to consider. 
The explanation simply does not make sense for the following 
reasons. Russell, the newly hired person, began training in mid-
April 1990 while Sheikh was on maternity leave. She continued to 
train for at least one or two weeks after Sheikh's last day on the 
job, May 24, 1990. During the time that Sheikh was on leave and 
Russell was training, there was a shortage of personnel. The 
"rotational schedule" that had been established in February and ran 
through May, placed Sheikh on the swing shift, but Russell was 
placed on the swing shift because of her training situation. Thus, 
Russell was on the swing shift in training for at least two weeks 
prior to Sheikh's return and at least one week after Sheikh left 
the job on May 24, 1990. During the time that Russell was in 
training prior to Sheikh's return, not a single dispatcher was 
scheduled to work the erratic and onerous type of schedule for 
which Sheikh was scheduled upon her return. During at least the 
four working days subsequent to Sheikh's last day on the job, not 
a single person was scheduled for the type of schedule with the 
erratic changes for which Sheikh had been scheduled. There is not 
one piece of evidence either in the documents or in all of the 
testimony at the hearing that explains why, under virtually 
identical circumstances and possibly even worse circumstances than 
before Sheikh returned, no one was given the schedule that Sheikh 
was given upon her return. The State continually claimed at the 
hearing that the aberrant schedule given to Sheikh was solely due 
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to the training of Russell yet never once in the entire hearing was 
it explained why no one else was given that schedule under 
virtually identical circumstances prior to Sheikh's return and 
subsequent to Sheikh's termination when Russell was in training. 
When asked to explain it, Nancy Allred could not. 
Other evidence in the record demonstrates that the articulated 
reason of training Russell and the existence of a rotating schedule 
were mere pre-text and not legitimate reasons. The State testified 
that all dispatchers had to work erratic schedules from time to 
time and pointed to "short change" or "double-back" shifts worked 
by employees in the past.4 The State testified that between 
December 23, 1989 and May 29, 1990 (approximately a 5 month period) 
that Marty had worked 4 double-backs, Lisa had worked 2 double-
backs, Patty had worked 1 double-back, Leah had worked 4 double-
backs, John had worked 1 double-back, Russell had worked 1 double-
back, Diane had worked 2 double-backs and Sandra had worked no 
double-backs. The State admitted, however, that these double-
backs were over a 5 month period, not a three week period, that 
these people had not been ore-scheduled for the short 
change/double-backs, rather they were the result of people calling 
in sick, going on vacation and other unplanned events. Further, 
the State acknowledged that major changes of shifts, eg. afternoons 
to graveyard, needed 3 days off in between to adjust, and that it 
was preferable to work the same shift for 3 weeks prior to 
4 
As seen by and the schedule as set forth in ALJ Order, Finding No. 12, p. 3, and Fact No. 21) 
Sheikh's schedule upon her return included a double-back each of 3 weeks and 3 and major shift changes within 
each of the 3 weeks. 
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switching to another shift. Sheikh's erratic and onerous 
schedule, including short-changes and major shift changes, was pre-
scheduled and pre-planned for Sheikh upon her return from maternity 
leave, whereas other persons who had worked short-changes were 
never pre-planned, rather they were the result of last minute 
changes necessitated under the circumstances and were spread over 
a considerable period of time. The State could not explain why in 
the two-year period from 1989 to 1990 no one was scheduled except 
Sheikh for such an onerous schedule even though during the period 
prior to Sheikh's return and after her termination, the same 
shortage of manpower existed and Russell was training. The State 
also tried to explain its failure to use A.J.'s (part-time 
personnel) to alleviate the onerous schedule given to Sheikh and to 
accommodate the training of Russell. As set forth in Finding No. 
8 of the ALJ Order, the State explained that A.J.'s could be used 
to cover shifts only if full-time personnel were first used and 
that there was a limited budget for A.J.'s The State admitted, 
however, that prior to Sheikh's return, A.J. 's were used to fill in 
the gaps rather than requiring any employee to work the type of 
schedule for which Sheikh was scheduled and that A.J.'s were used 
after Sheikh's termination to alleviate the problem of someone 
having to work the type of schedule for which Sheikh had been 
scheduled upon her return. There is no explanation as to why 
A.J.'s could be used prior to Sheikh's return while Russell was 
training and after Sheikh's termination, but not during the time 
after Sheikh had returned. The State also admitted that no effort 
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was made to determine whether the budget would allow the use of 
A.J.'s for the three-week onerous schedule on which Sheikh was 
placed upon her return from maternity leave, and that A.J.'s were 
not even considered to ameliorate the Sheikh Schedule. The only 
factor which distinguishes the situation during Russell's training 
prior to Sheikh's return and after Sheikh's termination is the fact 
that Sheikh returned from maternity leave. 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that there was no 
indication in the testimony that the State ever singled out Sheikh 
simply because she was pregnant or had been pregnant. (ALJ Order, 
p. 6) The Administrative Law Judge and the Commission ignored 
other pertinent testimony in the record. The second level 
supervisor, Nancy Allred testified that her job was very stressful, 
that there was a shortage of qualified people to work as 
dispatchers in the vicinity, and that anytime someone took vacation 
or leave or called in sick it created difficult scheduling 
problems. She testified (and Sheikh had heard her complaining on 
various occasions) that it is more difficult to deal with women who 
have small children because they are not as available to come in on 
short notice and various other reasons. Sheikh testified that she 
had initially given notice of the fact that she was pregnant and 
the date upon which she would commence her maternity leave and then 
subsequently she learned that her due date had changed and she had 
to give another notice changing the date upon which she wanted to 
commence maternity leave. She testified that Nancy Allred became 
visibly upset at the change and indicated that it was causing her, 
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(Allred) more trouble and stress because of having to do more 
scheduling. Allred testified that she had scheduled a number of 
people for maternity leave and that Sheikh's taking maternity leave 
was not something that she had not handled before; however, upon 
further examination by Sheikh's counsel, Allred admitted that she 
had never scheduled anyone except Shook for maternity leave. 
Scheduling Shook was not of the degree of difficulty and did not 
create the problems for Allred that other regular dispatcher's 
leave would create because Shook was the only person other than 
Allred who had a "fixed" schedule, that is she worked the same 
hours every day and did not rotate. Therefore, the scheduling of 
Shook was not necessarily a difficult task because of Shook's fixed 
schedule; on the contrary, the scheduling of a regular dispatcher 
who worked different shifts and rotated such as Sheikh, was 
difficult. 
Thus, Sheikhs maternity leave was a new, different and 
difficult experience for Allred. Scheduling dispatchers was 
already a very difficult and stressful task. Sheikh not only took 
maternity leave but changed the date for her requested leave and 
caused additional scheduling changes for Allred. This certainly is 
a significant indication of some motive to let Sheikh stay on a 
miserable schedule since Sheikh had made scheduling difficult for 
Allred and Shook, a task already very stressful. 
The Administrative Law Judge, in Finding No. 21, stated that 
the policy which Sheikh signed and of which she was aware was that 
employees would have to arrange for short-notice child care and 
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that the policy had been written in gender neutral terms and there 
was no indication that it was applied in a discriminatory fashion. 
This conclusion, that it was not applied in a discriminatory 
fashion, defies reason and is totally contrary to the evidence. 
Each of the employees were under the same policy but no explanation 
was given as to why Sheikh was treated in such a disparate manner 
under the same policy and same circumstances. 
The Administrative Law Judge seemed to find as pertinent to 
its conclusion that it was Shook, the shift supervisor who had made 
out the schedule for Sheikh and there was no evidence that it was 
made at the direction of Nancy Allred. This is totally immaterial. 
It makes no difference who made the schedule. Allred was Shook's 
immediate supervisor, and Allred had ultimate authority in 
scheduling. If, as claimed by Allred, Shook really did make the 
schedule, Allred was aware of it and had the power to change it. 
It is conceivable that Shook was as irritated by the need to 
schedule around a regular dispatcher's maternity leave, especially 
one who had changed her expected date for maternity leave, as 
Allred would have been. The fact is that Sheikh and Sheikh alone, 
following return from maternity leave, was given a schedule that no 
one had ever been given before and no one was given at least for 
the first week following Sheikh's termination and possibly forever 
after that. 
In conclusion, there was no evidence whatsoever to explain 
why, when Russell was in training before Sheikh's return and after 
she left, Sheikh was the only dispatcher ever given that particular 
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schedule. In this case it is not a matter of whether there is 
substantial evidence, there is absolutely no evidence to explain 
why the schedule only operated while Sheikh was there and not 
during the prior or subsequent weeks that Russell was training. 
B. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 
The Administrative Law Judge concluding that Sheikh Schedule 
11
 . . • although difficult was not intolerable." The Commission 
adopted the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and also 
concluded that Sheikh did not take advantage of opportunities to 
modify her schedule and that the schedule would have been resolved 
within a few weeks had she waited through the rotational process. 
These conclusions by the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Commission are not supported by substantial evidence when the 
record is viewed as a whole; in fact, they are not substantiated by 
virtually any evidence whatsoever. As explained in Point I supra, 
both the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission also 
misinterpreted the law and stopped short of a complete application. 
The standard, as explained above, is whether a reasonable person 
would find this schedule intolerable. The law also requires the 
employer to at least give some assurances that the intolerable 
aspects would be changed and requires that the employee must at 
least give a fair chance to the employer to make such adjustments. 
Garner, supra. 
In regard to whether the schedule was "intolerable", neither 
the Commission nor the Administrative Law Judge made any findings 
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whatsoever to support the conclusion that it was not intolerable. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that John Kelly, a fellow 
dispatch employee who had been a dispatcher for 2 1/2 years thought 
it was a rigorous schedule but that he would not have been 
surprised to receive it and he would have worked it, and the 
Administrative Law Judge determined that scheduling conditions in 
the dispatch office were generally erroneous. (ALJ Order, Fining 
No. 13, p. 4) That is certainly not "substantial evidence" that 
the schedule was not "intolerable". John Kelly can speculate, but 
he was never asked to work it. Sheikh, a good employee of 10 
years, found it intolerable and was unable to do so. In fact, it 
flies in the face of the abundance of evidence to the contrary. No 
finding was made that Sheikh was not a "reasonable person" or that 
John Kelly was somehow more "reasonable" in judging whether the 
schedule was intolerable. Sheikh was the only one asked to work it 
and who attempted to do so. Sheikh testified that it was 
intolerable and that she physically and mentally and emotionally 
could not work the schedule. It was impossible to get a sleep 
cycle, eating routine or spend time with her family; also, it 
created great stress due to concern she would not be functioning as 
she should and would endanger the officers lives. The evidence 
shows that Shook called Sheikh to tell her about the schedule and 
told her she had "bad" news and Shook testified that she would not 
want to work it. This "bad" schedule obviously was something of an 
aberration even in a dispatch office where generally onerous 
conditions existed. If the schedule/conditions were generally 
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onerous, by definition, a schedule like Sheikhs was "intolerable". 
Just prior to February, 1990, the schedule which had been a 2 week 
rotational was changed to the 3 week rotational, because employees 
need a set shift for 3 weeks to adjust to new a new shift; 3 days 
off were scheduled between shift changes to allow the adjustment 
and no short-changes were scheduled. The Sheikh Schedule contained 
3 shift changes per week, and a short-change per week. It is 
undisputed that this type of a schedule had never been 
intentionally pre-scheduled for anyone and that the major shift 
changes and short-changes which were pre-scheduled for Sheikh only 
occurred otherwise periodically in an unexpected situation (not 3 
weeks running) and would never be deliberately scheduled. 
In finding that Sheikh was not constructively discharged, the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Commission apparently took into 
consideration the contradicted and refuted testimony of Shook and 
Allred that Sheikh made no request to do anything about changing 
the schedule until May 10, 1990 and the testimony by Shook that 
Sheikh did not tell her that she could not or would not work the 
assigned schedule. The implication is that neither Shook nor 
Allred had any idea that Sheikh was unhappy about the schedule. 
That defies common sense. Even Shook admitted that when she called 
Sheikh to tell her of the schedule just before Sheikh's return to 
work she told Sheikh she was not going to like it and it was "bad" 
news. Obviously, Shook knew that no one, including Sheikh, would 
find the schedule acceptable. But more importantly, the fact is 
that by at least May 10, 1990, the day Sheikh gave notice, both 
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Shook and Allred knew that Sheikh intended to quit because of the 
schedule. There is no evidence whatsoever that either Shook or 
Allred made any effort to assure Sheikh that adjustments would be 
made, and/or that she would go off of the schedule on May 24, 1990 
and would be given a reasonable and standard schedule in the 
rotational process, and neither made any attempt to ask Sheikh to 
remain with the Department. 
This action/inaction by Shook and Allred not only clearly 
demonstrates the intent to discriminate against Sheikh but 
demonstrates that the Judges conclusions that Sheikh was not 
constructively discharged are simply erroneous and are not 
supported by substantial evidence. The Court in the Garner case 
implicitly required the employer to give some assurances or 
actually attempt to ameliorate the intolerable situation. It is 
inconceivable that given the difficulty in finding qualified people 
in the Price area and the stress of working short-handed and 
without adequate manpower, that Allred and Shook would stand by 
without saying a word, without making any efforts to remedy the 
problem, without asking Sheikh to stay on, without any action 
whatsoever, and watch a gooH employee of over ten years leave the 
department, unless that is exactly what they wanted. Shook had no 
explanation for the inaction except when asked why, she said "I 
don't know." Furthermore, as set forth in the Garner case, the 
Court expects the employee to give the employer at least a 
reasonable chance to alleviate the intolerable aspects of the 
situation. Sheikh gave two weeks notice. The State had two weeks 
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to make some attempt to give assurances or talk to Sheikh or 
ameliorate the problem. Thus, Sheikh did act reasonably and within 
the requirements of the law of constructive discharge. T h e 
Administrative Law Judge and the Commission also determined that 
Sheikh did not take advantage of self-help opportunities, that is, 
to ask other dispatchers to trade shifts with her. (ALJ Order, 
Finding No. 18; Review Order, p. 2) Again, there is no requirement 
under the law of constructive discharge that the employee attempt 
to circumvent the intolerable situation complained of and created 
by the employer by such type of action. There is no evidence, much 
less "substantial evidence" in the record to indicate that it would 
have been possible to trade shifts with another employee 
sufficiently to alleviate the intolerable schedule. Sheikh 
testified that she had been informed that it was contrary to 
department policy to trade shifts without the consent of a 
supervisor and was under the impression that she was not allowed to 
try to do so. Thus, there is certainly not "substantial evidence" 
that Sheikh could have traded shifts, because there is 
diametrically opposed testimony on the issue of whether it was 
allowed, and there is no testimony to indicate that others would 
have been willing to trade or a trade would have been sufficient to 
adequately alleviate the intolerable schedule. 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Commission both concluded 
that the schedule would have resolved itself within a few weeks had 
Sheikh waited for the next "rotation11. (ALJ Order, Finding No. 19, 
p. 5; Review Order, p. 2) The proposition that Sheikh could have 
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expected the schedule to be resolved due to "normal" rotation 
within a few weeks is absurd. It not only lacks substantial 
evidence supporting the proposition, it lacks virtually any 
evidence supporting it. The rotation schedule to which the 
Administrative Law Judge and apparently the Commission were 
referring was created in February of 1990. The idea was that each 
shift would rotate down to the next shift after three weeks; 
however, the entire transcript is replete with evidence that there 
had never been a schedule that Allred could remember that had ever 
worked as planned and that there were always changes. In fact 
under the pre-planned schedule created in February, Sheikh was to 
have worked the swing shift for three weeks upon her return; 
however, just prior to Sheikh returning to work, she was informed 
of a radical difference, in fact she was informed that she would be 
working the schedule of which she has complained and which she 
found intolerable. Thus the conclusion by the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Commission that she would have rotated out of it is 
simply without any basis in.fact. She could no more anticipate 
that after May 24, 1990 she would rotate out of the onerous 
schedule she was in than she could have anticipated in February 
that she would have been placed in that onerous schedule when she 
was scheduled for a swing shift for three weeks. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that Sheikh "....was aware 
of this rotation...." Sheikh has testified that she did understand 
rotation; she had "rotated" for years before and never refused a 
particular shift; but given the Sheikh Schedule instead of the 
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swing originally scheduled. She did not know what, if any change 
would occur after May 24, 1990. Neither Allred or Shook told her 
the schedule would change or what her schedule would be. Yes, she 
knew the concept was a rotation one, but it certainly had not 
worked as expected on her return from leave; for that matter, 
according to Allred the schedules had never worked as planned. 
Nancy also was unable to say what schedule Sheikh would have worked 
had she stayed after May 24, 1990. Thus, if Allred could not 
determine what Sheikh would have worked after May 24, 1990, Sheikh 
certainly could not make such a determination. Allred also 
admitted even she could not say what Sheikh's schedule would have 
been after May 24, 1990. (ALJ Order, Finding No. 20, p. 5) Sheikh 
testified that she knew of the pre-planned schedule wherein she 
would be working the swing shift and she was aware that the concept 
was to rotate every three weeks. She was not aware that she would 
be placed in a schedule which no one else ever had before; and she 
had no way of knowing whether she was still going to be treated in 
a disparate and discriminatory fashion after May 24, 1990, but 
believed she would be. She felt that she was being punished or 
"paid back" for having taken maternity leave, changing her dates 
for maternity leave, and making life generally difficult for Shook 
and Allred. The fact that neither Shook nor Allred gave any 
assurances nor did they make any efforts to talk to Sheikh about 
staying with the department or make any effort to ameliorate the 
onerous schedule reinforced that belief. 
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The Administrative Law Judge also seemed to find some 
materiality in the fact that Sheikh called in sick several times 
during the three-week period and did not actually work the short-
changes and some of the major changes. (ALJ Order, Finding No. 16, 
p. 4) The Administrative Law Judge also found that she called in 
sick "...even though she was not.11 (ALJ Order, Finding No. 18, p. 
5) This finding that she called in sick even though she was not is 
shocking. There is not one bit of evidence that she was not sick 
when she called in sick. Sheikh testified that she could not 
tolerate the massive shift changes and double-backs physically, 
mentally or emotionally and was simply unable to work them. There 
was no testimony to the contrary that she was actually not sick and 
unable to work the schedule. It is not a matter of whether there 
was substantial evidence, there was no evidence that she was not 
sick. The fact that she did not work the schedule does not change 
the discrimination and the constructive discharge of the situation. 
The very fact that she was unable to work the shift itself 
demonstrates the intolerability of the schedule and the fact that 
she was constructively discharged. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's Order affirming the Administrative Law Judge 
Decision in denying Sheikh's Motion for Review was entered based on 
an erroneous interpretation and application of the law and was 
based upon determinations of fact not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record. Accordingly, 
this Court should remand the matter to the Commission with 
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directions to enter an order granting Sheikh's Motion for Review 
and ordering Sheikh's reinstatement and to make findings and 
conclusions on the amount of money owed to her, ie, determining the 
back pay from the date of her constructive discharge on May 24, 
1990 plus interest at 10% per annum and to obtain affidavits of 
costs and attorney's fees and calculate that amount into the total 
judgment in favor of Sheikh and enter judgment in favor of Sheikh 
against the State accordingly. 
Respectively submitted this 
Slfr Po day of February, 1995. 
MCDONALD & WES^ 
y 
izanney 
'Attorp^ysf for Pe t i t i one r 
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ADDENDA 
Tab 1: Trial Exhibit tfAfl Findings, Conclusion and Order, 
September 9, 1993 by Benjamin A. Sims, ALJ 
Tab 2: Trial Exhibit f,B" Order Denying Motion for Review, dated 
August 25, 1994. 
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Tab A 
INDUSTRIAL OOKMXOOICM OF UTJVK 
Case NO. UADD NO. 90-0467 
EEOC NO. 35C-90-0413 
SANDRA SHEIKH; 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
STATE OP UTAH / UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 
Respondent. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
if 
it 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
ADDEAJPLMJOEC t 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 south, salt Lake city, Utah on August 
27, 1993, at 8»30 o'clock A.m. R*\A hAAring 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Benjamin A, Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
TKo CKtr^iwg P*>»t:y, C*n£k»* CHeikh, \s%tt ^ oeent *tn<l 
represented by Suzanne West, Attorney at Law, 
The respondent employer, State of Utah Department 
of Public Safety, was represented by Stephen G. 
Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney General, 
This case involves a claim of sex discrimination because of 
pregnancy and maternity leave and the Charging Party requests that 
she be reinstated to her position, that she receive back pay from 
the claimed time of constructive discharge at a salary level bi-
weekly of $638.40 plus 10% interest per year on the salary, and in 
addition, reasonable attorney's fees, 
FIHDIHOS or FACTt 
1. The Charging Party, Sandra Sheikh, was earning $638.40 bi-
amount of $186.36 bi-weekly. 
2. The Charging Party had boon given credit for working for 
the state government (Department of Public Safety) of approximately 
ten and one-half 
discharge. 
years at the time vf e*ll«y«<3 Lun»liu^tiv« 
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3. While there are positive aspects to the radio dispatcher 
position which was held by the Charging Party, the negative aspects 
of the position were shown to be, among others, that it was an 
extremely stressful position requiring frequent rotation into 
different shifts including graveyard, and what are called Mshort 
change41 *hift». There are no more than eignt nours rest between 
such "short change11 shifts. In addition, the evidence shows that 
a dispatcher may not be able to leave his/her worksite without 
proper coverage; may be unable to schedule hio/her own breaks/ way 
h*VA 1<*n<f*H r\ppo*r*:uni*y to oooialioo with oo w*irkei.-o dui-iii^ 
cover shifts on short notice; may be required to work weekends on 
a regular basis; may be unable Lu uhoope the days ott or enirtc; 
may have to work split days off during a work week; may have to 
IMTOOUJTfli C h i l d C A V A »•». <-*^~ W«-»\*j-'o rvo4: xc?* « t * > y t . i t n * ^ « y «>ar n i ^ h t / m a y 
have to get child oarc for weekends, holidays, and the middle of 
the night on a regular basis; may have to be prepared to work 
immediately when his/her shift begins; and may have to cancel days 
Off or holiday plane on short notice. Also among other 
requirements, may have to handle life threatening emergency 
oituationc on tho radio involving polivc cu-*U CIIIOL ^ O V ^ I Q wUllt? 
maintaining a calm professional demeanor; must answer and respond 
to calls for ambulance or paramedics and be able to help the person 
by giving instructions. 
4. On October 26, 198 9, the Charging Party acknowledged by 
signature that she had read and considered three pages of factors 
such as those heretofore mentioned* 
5. Prior to the consolidation of county and state dispatch 
functions in 1988, the Charging Party worked for the county 
sheriff's office. In 1988, after the consolidation of services, 
various dispatch organizations were combined into a state 
organization under the Utah Department of Public Safety. 
6. After consolidation, a fixed schedule for dispatchers was 
attempted based on seniority. The Charging Party probably had the 
most or the second most seniority. The fived system of scheduling 
wa» c;nanyeu u«udu«y junior employees never got weeKends Otr, and 
were often relegated to working graveyard shifts. During a normal 
week, there were often daily changes to the schedule due to 
sickness and other requirements, such as vacation, compensatory 
tima and unexpected emergencies in the staff's personal life. When 
a member of the shift called in sick,- another member was normally 
asked to come in. The routine to cover the unscheduled events was 
that an earlier shift would be transferred to the later shift. For 
example, the 3 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift would be transferred to the 
11*66 p.?n» *.o ?tOO *.m. •hi£t; in t-ho evont the 0*00 p.m. tw 11*00 
p.m. shift was unable to come to work. 
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7. Lisa Shook and Nancy Allred worked fixed shifts only since 
they were supervisory personnel. 
8. If money was available within certain personnel 
constraints, part-timers known as MA.J.fl personnel could be used to 
cover the shifts, but only if full-time personnel were first used* 
9. The evidence shows that the Price dispatch office had 
little or no personnel resource slack and in the event that one or 
more people called in unavailable for duty there was a scheduling 
problem created. 
10. The Charging Party became pregnant sometime in 1989 and 
her delivery date was established as March 8, . 1990. She duly 
requested maternity leave and Lisa Shook, shift supervisor, was 
informed in September 1989. Lisa Shook we^s also pregnant at the 
time. The dispatchers often complained about the schedules and as 
a result, John Kelly, a dispatcher, came up with a "better11 system 
of scheduling. That system was later adopted by a second level 
supervisor, Nancy Allred. This new schedule was completed and 
implemented with the modification to allow a three week rotational 
period rather than the two week rotation, after the employees felt 
that two weeks was insufficient time to adjust to shift changes. 
11. The Charging Party left her position to take maternity 
leave effective March 4, 1990 at which time she was under the 
impression that she would be returning to work on a swing shift on 
May 5, 1990. However, she returned on May 4, 1990. 
12. A few days prior to her return, the Charging Party was 
called by Lisa Shook, the first level supervisor, who informed her 
(the Charging Party) that she would return to work on the following 
schedule: Friday, May 4, 1990 - 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (CPR 
Training), and 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Saturday, May 5, 1990 -
11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May 6, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 
a.m.; Monday, May 7, 1990 - 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight; Tuesday, 
May 8, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 9, 1990 - off; Thursday, May 10, 
1990 - noon to 8:00 p.m.; Friday, May 11, 1990 - 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 
p.m.; Saturday, May 12, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May 
13/ 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Monday, May 14, 1990 - 4:00 
p.m. to midnight; Tuesday, May 15, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 16, 
1990 - off; Thursday, May 17, 1990'- 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.; 
Friday, May 18, 1990 - 9:00 a.m. to 5:Q0 p.m.; Saturday, May 19, 
1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May 20, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. 
to 7:00 a.m.; Monday, May 21, 1990 - 4:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.; 
Tuesday, May 22, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 23, 1990 - off; 
Thursday, May 24, 1990 - 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.. This schedule 
resulted because, among other problems, a trainee by the name of 
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Russell was hired and trainees created special scheduling problems 
since they could not be alone during a six to eight week training 
period. 
13. This schedule was admittedly difficult, but the evidence 
shows that the scheduling conditions in the dispatch office were 
general onerous. John Kelly, a fellow dispatch employee, testified 
that although it was a rigorous schedule, he would not have been 
surprised to have received it, and he would have worked it. 
14. Although the Charging Party felt that the schedule was 
made as "punishment", neither at the time of Me. Shook's telephone 
call nor thereafter did the Charging Party tell Ms. Shook that she 
could not or would not work the assigned schedule. Because Ms. 
Shook knew that the schedule was difficult, she.made an offer to 
the Charging Party that the Charging Party could work graveyard in 
order to avoid the double back or short change schedule. 
15. The second level supervisor, Nancy Allred, was not aware 
that the Charging Party was unhappy about the schedule until May 
10, 1990. The Charging Party made no request to do anything about 
the schedule until May 10th on which date she asked for either job 
sharing or a fixed schedule. There was no job sharing authorized 
in the Utah dispatch function during this time period. Ms. Allred 
told the Charging Party that she oould ask others to trade and that 
could be done without an okay from Ms. Allred. Trading shifts was 
established routine in the dispatch office, and no advance 
supervisory approval was required. There was no evidence that the 
Charging Party attempted to ask others to trade shifts. 
16. The Charging Party did not work any other of the short 
change shifts. She did work the graveyard shift on May 4, 5, and 
6th, but did not work that shift on May 10, 12, 13, 19 or the 20th. 
She did not work on May 7th, rather she took time off without pay 
for seven hours and took one hour of vacation leave. On Tuesday 
and Wednesday, May 8th and 9th, respectively, she had no scheduled 
shifts. On May 10th she worked from 1200 to 2000 hours. On May 
llth, she worked from 1500 to 2330 hours. On Saturday and Sunday 
May 12th and 13th, she called in sick. She worked on Monday from 
1600 to 2400, She was off on Tuesday and Wednesday, on Thursday, 
she worked from 0800 until 1600, and on Friday, May 18th, she 
worked from 0900 to 1700 hours. On the 19th and 20th the charging 
Party was off without pay. On May 21, 1990, 6he worked from 1600 
to 0100 hours. She was off on May 22nd and 23d; on May 24th she 
worked from 0800 until 1600 and after that point she did not work 
since she had voluntarily resigned on May 10, 1990, and gave the 
respondent a two week notioe. 
17. Although there was evidence that the charging Party had 
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been dissatisfied with her job as a dispatcher ever since the job 
had been consolidated into a state operation, there was no evidence 
that the dissatisfaction resulted from any illegal discrimination 
against any employee prior to the allegations of this current 
complaint• 
18, There was no indication that the Charging Party took 
advantage of the opportunity to request that other employees 
substitute for her in this admittedly difficult work schedule. The 
Charging Party did use self help measures to take herself out of 
this schedule by calling in sick even though she was not- There 
was no evidence that any adverse action was taken or was_ being 
contemplated as a result of her action. To the contrary, there was 
evidence that management considered her to be a good employee. 
19, Had the Charging Party waited through the rotation period 
of three weeks she would have rotated to the next position since 
all employees would rotate through all the various schedules and 
the rotation was based on a three week period, 
20. The Charging Party was aware of this rotation although 
she claimed that no one told her that she would not have to work 
this schedule, indefinitely. 
21. The Charging Party claims that the evidence which shows 
the discriminatory basis against women was indicated by the policy 
that employees would have to be on the job and would have to 
arrange for short notice child care. In addition, the Charging 
Party states that Ms. Allred got upset when she was informed that 
the Charging Party was pregnant since the schedule would have to be 
modified again. However, Ms. Allred did not make the schedule 
which the Charging Party found to be hintolerable•" Another 
pregnant supervisor made the schedule, and there was no evidence 
that the schedule was made at the direction of Ms. Allred. This 
former condition of employment was known to the Charging Party as 
early as 1989 when she signed a document acknowledging this fact. 
That document was written in gender neutral terms and there is no 
indication that the policy was ever applied in a discriminatory 
fashion. The latter evidence, although not corroborated, but even 
if believed does not rise to the level of showing motivation for 
discrimination since more than eight weeks had passed between the 
event and the Charging Party's return to work on the schedule in 
question; and since Me. Allred did not make the schedule, 
LEGAL DISCUSSION! 
A disparate treatment case requires a showing, through direct 
or circumstantial evidence, of an intent to discriminate that shows 
that the employer was motivated by an improper and discriminatory 
purpose in his conduct. An employee in a disparate treatment 
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employment discrimination case has the initial burden to establish 
* prima fac^g showing of the employer's discrimination, 
Thereafter, the burden of production shifts to the employer to 
articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the 
conduct in question. If the employer succeeds, the burden of 
production shifts back to the employee to show that the reasons 
articulated by the employer were mere pretext for discrimination* 
Despite the shifting of the burden of production in the disparate 
treatment discrimination cases, the burden of persuasion remains 
with the Charging Party throughout the case. 
In order to establish a prima ..facie, case, the Charging-Party 
must show that she was a member of a group protected by UCA §34-
35-6; that she was qualified for the job; that she was 
constructively discharged, despite her qualifications, and as a 
part of the constructive discharge, she must show that a reasonable 
person would view the working conditions as intolerable* 
The Charging Party was a member of a group protected by UCA 
§34-35-6. She applied for and was granted a maternity leave based 
on pregnancy during the period in question. There was never any 
dispute during the course of the hearing that she was qualified for 
her job. The major issue was whether the employer discriminated 
against the Charging Party by adverse job action and if so, whether 
the conditions were so unreasonable that she was justified in 
discharging herself from those conditions. 
Although the schedule the Charging Party complains of was 
difficult, she failed to take action such as asking others to work 
her shifts which was permissible, or to simply wait for the 
rotational process to obtain a better work schedule* She did call 
in eiok, and took herself out of the more difficult parts of the 
schedule* There was no evidence that any adverse action was taken 
against her or was even being contemplated* In addition, she had 
the means within her control to properly modify the schedule to her 
liking by asking other workers to trade shifts, but there was no 
evidence that she made any attempt to change the schedule beyond 
asking the supervisor to modify it. 
There was no indication in testimony at the hearing that the 
employer ever singled out the Charging Party simply because she was 
pregnant or had been pregnant. According to testimony, the 
Charging Party would have rotated out* of the schedule as all 
employees rotate through all the schedules of the shifts with each 
employee's schedule being approximately three weeks in length. 
The employer articulated legitimate reasons for the schedule 
such as the fact that they had at least one and on occasion two 
vacancies during the previous several months that training of a new 
*«miavee necessitated schedule aberrations and the normal process 
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of people being sick. The necessity of changing the schedule was 
evident since during the time that the schedule was in operation, 
the Charging Party called in sick on a number of occasions during 
this period simply because she did not like the schedule, and other 
dispatch employees had to substitute for her on short notice. 
Although he schedule in question deviated from one of the normal 
shifts, the employer satisfactorily explained the aberrations. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1< During the evidentiary hear! « it vos determined that the 
Ciargin.. ^ arty had barely managed to make a prima facie case.. Upon 
retrospect., and considering the total evidence, it is appar nt that 
the balance must shift in favor of determining that the employee 
failed to make a prl^a, fccle case in this matter• In any event, 
assuming tiac the emplc/ee did make a pri^* facie the employer 
articulated ultimate reasons why the Charging Party's schedule 
was difficult and theref .*e it is concluded that the Charging Party 
cannct prevail. The employer, the State of Utah, the Ut^h 
Department of Public Safety did not discriminate against Sandra 
Shiekh because cf her pregnancy, and her work schedule for the 
period May 4 through May 24, 1993, although difficult was not 
intolerable* Ms. Shiekh's resignation was therefore not a 
constructive discharge. There was therefore no discriminatory or 
unfair emplcsfmont practices under UCA Sect. 34-35-6(1) (a) • 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Charging Party, fsndra 
Sheikh, has failed to establish a prima facie case in the claim of 
discrimination by her employer, the State of Utah, Department of 
Public Safety, and thu* that claim should be and is nereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FUR ER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing with the Industrial Commission 
of Utah within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in 
detail tha particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. In 
the event a Motion for Review is ti-ely filed, the parties shall 
have fifteen (15) days from the date of filing with the Commission, 
in which to file a written response with t^e Commission in 
TabB 
C-J 1-Cc/cn 
RELii.v <CL> AuG 2 9 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SANDRA SHEIKH, 
Charging Party, 
vs. * 
* 
STATE OF UTAH/UTAH DEPARTMENT * 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, * 
* 
Respondent. * 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
UADD No. 
EEOC NO. 
90-0467 
35C-90-0413 
This matter is before the Industrial Commission of Utah 
pursuant to the Motion For Review filed by Sandra Sheikh, seeking 
review of an Administrative Law Judge's Order which dismissed Ms, 
Sheikh's charge of unlawful discrimination against the State of 
Utah's Department of Public Safety. 
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over this Motion For 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34-
35-7.1(11) and Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4.A.5. 
BACKGROUND 
Ms. Sheikh filed a complaint with the Utah Antidiscrimination 
Division ("UADD") charging that the Utah Department of Public 
Safety ("Public Safety") unlawfully discriminated against her 
because of pregnancy. After an investigation, UADD found 
reasonable cause to believe "that Ms. Sheikh had been subjected to 
unlawful discrimination due to her pregnancy. 
Public Safety requested and was granted an evidentiary 
hearing. After a lengthy hearing with several witnesses and 
numerous items of documentary evidence, the ALJ concluded that Ms. 
Sheikh had failed to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination. Ms. Sheikh then filed her Motion For Review with 
the Commission. In her Motion For Review, Ms. Sheikh argues that 
the preponderance of the evidence does not support the ALJ's 
findings and that the findings themselves are inadequate. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the 
decision of the ALJ. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section §34-35-6 of Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act sets forth 
the "discriminatory or prohibited employment practices" which are 
prohibited by the Act: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a) (i) for an employer to . . . discriminate in 
matters of . . . conditions of employment against any 
person otherwise qualified, because of . . . pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, . . . . 
(emphasis added.) 
Ms. Sheikh argues that Public Safety assigned her an unusually 
difficult work schedule as punishment for taking maternity leave. 
However, for the various reasons detailed in his decision, the ALJ 
concluded otherwise. The ALJ found, and the Commission agrees, 
that Ms.-Sheikh's schedule was not motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose, but by the employer's staffing needs. Furthermore, Ms. 
Sheikh did not take advantage of opportunities to modify the 
schedule. Finally, the staffing problems that caused the 
difficulties with Ms. Sheikh's schedule would have been resolved 
within a few weeks. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies Ms. Sheikh's 
Motion For Review and affirms the ALJ's decision. It is so 
ordered. 
Dated this-J4>^'day of August, 1994 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
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NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20. 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of 
Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of this Order, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Alan Hennebold, certify that I did mail by prepaid first 
class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of Sandra Sheikh v. State-of Utah 
Department of Public Safety, Case Number 90-04 67, on theo7j3££day of 
August, 1994, to the following: 
Suzanne West, Attorney 
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON 
455 E. 500 S. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen Schwendiman, Attorney 
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4120 State Office Building 
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